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A Calculated Crusade:
Venice, Commerce, and the Fourth Cru-
sade
James B. Hooper
When Urban II preached the First Crusade to the
Council of Clermont at the end of the 11th century, he
urged a pre-emptive strike against the Muslims whose
military advances continually threatened the eastern
boundaries of the Byzantine Empire.  Exhorting his
spiritual subjects to “destroy that vile race from the
lands of our friends,” Urban inspired an emotional
response from western Christians based on the fact
that their Muslim opponents differed so greatly from
them in culture, religion, and ethnicity.1  The popular
polarization of light versus dark, Christ versus Mo-
hammed, west versus east, and good versus evil filled
many Europeans with hatred and ignited the flames of
crusade that would not be extinguished for hundreds
of years.  However, closer examination of the Crusades
and the relationships developed therein reveal that a
diametric reduction of the conflict is grossly inaccu-
rate.  In fact, the intimate trade relationships that the
Venetians developed as a result of the early Crusades
gave them specific knowledge which proved paramount
in the redirection of the Fourth Crusade through
Constantinople. 
As the First Crusade took form and the Holy Land
erupted in religious conflict, the Christians occupied
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a number of territories—including Jerusalem—known
as the Crusader States.  After stabilizing the region as
much as possible, a practical problem emerged.  Since
all the Muslims had not been expelled from the Levant,
the two sides would be forced to live in peace together.
While the war had been founded on cultural incompat-
ibility and religious opposition, neither side could
justify genocide.  When Christians had gained firm
control of the Holy Land and had established the
Crusader States, they allowed Muslims and Jews to
live under their jurisdiction with relative freedom,
adopting “an attitude of relative tolerance towards
other creeds.”2  According to Jonathan Phillips, the
Christians lived side-by-side with Muslims not neces-
sarily out of any religious concession, but simply
because “it was impractical for the Franks to drive out
or persecute all those who did not observe the Latin
rite.”3  
The interfaith communities that developed as a
result of the First Crusade led to a dramatic rise in
cross-cultural contact.  Although there was no love
lost between Christians and Muslims, out of necessity
and comparative advantage, they began trading with
one another.  The Muslims could obtain goods from
the East that were not available in great quantities in
Europe, while in exchange, the westerners could offer
raw materials from the countryside as well as finished
goods from the more specialized urban centers of the
medieval west.  In addition, the Crusaders who settled
1
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in the Levant harvested such cash crops as sugar and
cotton, as well as millet, maize, grapes and olives for
export, making the East a thriving commercial center.4
Most of this economic activity took shape in the form
of the Islamic kharaj, a tax system where the indige-
nous subjects of the Crusader States paid their Chris-
tian rulers from their crops.5
Before the Crusades, the Mediterranean was
already the scene of a robust inter-cultural economy.
The merchant city-states of Southern Italy, especially
Amalfi, dominated trade in the Southeast Mediterra-
nean in places such as Jerusalem and Alexandria.
The Amalfitans were mostly involved in the import of
luxury items from the East for the wealthy courts and
monasteries throughout Southern Europe and the
Byzantine Empire.  These southern Italian merchants
maintained a level of maritime dominance throughout
the tenth and eleventh centuries, and it was only later
that the Venetians, the Pisans and the Genoese
surpassed their southern rivals in the control of the
Levant microeconomy.6
Nevertheless, Northern Italians did have an eastern
Mediterranean presence in the pre-Crusading years.
A huge collection of correspondence and contracts
found in Old Cairo contains hundreds of letters
pertaining to Egyptian and Mediterranean trade during
the period from 900-1300.  One letter written in
approximately 1060 by an Egyptian merchant named
Nahray ben Nissim mentions the Italians present in
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Alexandria at the time.  Indiscriminately referred to as
Rumi, the Italians are mentioned in a number of other
documents buying indigo and brazilwood, a material
grown in India and used as a red dye for textiles.  In
another letter, the Italians are involved in the purchase
of large quantities of flax.  The author of the letters is
under the impression that the Rumi will pay excessive
prices for these commodities, and will pay the same for
poor quality flax as high quality flax.  This assessment
seems to indicate either the value and scarcity of these
products in the west, or the incompetence of the
Italians.  One letter specifically identifies Genoese
merchants in Alexandria, so we know that the
Amalfitans did not operate a maritime monopoly.7
But, prior to the crusades, the involvement of northern
Italian merchants in Egyptian commerce was neither
regular nor widespread.8
Interestingly enough, the advent of the crusading
era undermined the Amalfitans’ commercial superior-
ity.  Tied up in the politics of the turbulent region of
southern Italy, the Amalfitans could not coordinate a
fleet for the First Crusade, and their northern counter-
parts managed to obtain the privilege of the crusaders
for their naval assistance and religious devotion.  In
exchange for their commitment to the crusading cause
by 1104, the Genoese received the first honors, receiv-
ing total exemption from commercial duties at a
3
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number of Holy Land ports.9  The Venetians profited
considerably from their crusade to assist King Baldwin
in the defense of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1122-
1124.  They were given various rights in all the major
cities of the Kingdom, and were promised one third of
Tyre and Ascalon if they helped the Christians capture
them.10  In the process, the Venetians encountered and
destroyed Egypt’s most effective naval fleet as the
Muslims attempted to regain a foothold in the Levant.11
Beyond that, the Venetians managed to ravage enough
Byzantine holdings to scare emperor John II
Comnenus into issuing a new chrysobull to Venice,
renewing their inordinately advantageous commercial
privileges in Eastern Europe.  So, for the Northern
Italian merchant states, the Crusades proved to be
beneficial in more than just a spiritual dimension.  
The early Crusades gave rise to Acre as a major
port of the eastern Mediterranean, and the subsequent
control of the coastline of the Levant achieved by the
conquest of Tyre (with the exception of Ascalon)
ensured the presence of western merchants in the east
for years to come.  The popular trade route that
emerged in the mid-1100s took merchants from
northern Italy with finished goods to deliver to Acre,
92 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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and then on to Alexandria, the more profitable market,
with luxury goods and more attractive investments.  In
this system, Acre is merely a link point between the
Frankish settlers and the Egyptians, an excuse to
connect the worlds of Islam and Christianity.12  Adolf
Schaube contends that by 1150, a sophisticated
monetary system had developed that transferred silver
from the west into gold that was coined in Jerusalem
and used to purchase goods in Alexandria.  By this
time, Alexandria had established itself as a major hub
of economic prosperity, and both Italians and Crusad-
ers had taken a significant interest in it.13 
Alexandria gained such a distinct advantage over
the Christian port of Acre by the 1150s, primarily
because of its geographic advantage.  As the main
trading locus of the Egyptian region, merchants in
Alexandria were able to gain access to the world of the
west through the Mediterranean, and had access to
the vast resources of India and the east by virtue of its
proximity to the Red Sea.  According to David Abulafia,
“Alexandria was the interchange point between [two]
otherwise largely self-contained trading systems.”14
Although operating on favorable terms with easterners,
the Christians of Acre could never hope to enjoy that
kind of connection because of their location on the
comparatively static Levant coast, and the Egyptians
had control of the Red Sea.
At this point, the Muslims were regaining a signifi-
cant level of military power and political control over
5
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the regions they had lost to the Christians during the
first quarter-century of the crusading era.  After their
devastation at the hands of westerners during the First
Crusade, the Muslims lacked the ability to organize a
cohesive political union strong enough to combat their
Christian occupiers until around 1139.  Around this
time, the emir of Aleppo, a Muslim town just to the
east of the major crusader city of Antioch (the seat of
a Christian principality) began to gain control and
command some military authority.  His name was
Zengi, and he set the stage for a dramatic re-unifica-
tion of the Muslim empire when he recaptured the
northeastern crusader city of Edessa in1144.15  Under
Zengi and his son Nur al-Din, the unifying message of
jihad enabled the Muslims to take advantage of
Frankish politicians who were primarily involved in
internal squabbles.  In addition to Christian rulers,
even Muslim leaders of the northeastern portion of the
Holy Land were indiscriminately swept under the
control of Zengi and Nur al-Din.  The rise of the
Zangids was less a divinely inspired reclamation than
an attempt at expanding political sway.16  This rising
threat sparked a new crusade from the west, preached
primarily by Bernard of Clairvaux, which met little
success.17
After the conquest of Damascus by Nur al-Din in
1154 and the acquisition of Ascalon by the Frankish
King Baldwin III, a period of stability followed.  But,
the focus of the political conflicts moved to the south-
94 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      18Holt, 46.
      19Mahmoud Omran, “King Amalric and the Siege of
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      21Ibid.
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ern region of the Levant, and Egypt came to the
foreground.  By mid-century, the authority of the
Fatimids who controlled the Muslims in North Africa
was beginning to wane.18  Around 1163 Baldwin was
able to “place Egypt under tribute,”19 at least to some
extent.  Soon after his death, Baldwin’s successor,
Amalric, mismanaged his holdings in Egypt and
jeopardized his truce with Nur al-Din in Damascus by
leading a number of sorties into Egypt and Alexandria
over the next 4 years.20  The Christian king intervened
in the intra-territorial dispute between the Fatimid
viziers fighting for political control, but could not make
any advances because he was thwarted by the inter-
vention of Nur al-Din’s head commander, Shirkuh,
who hoped to secure the valuable Egyptian cities for
his own interests.21  In 1167 and 1168, Amalric again
attempted to take over Egypt.  This time, he was
completely expelled and his army was obliterated.  
Amalric’s attempts at strengthening his own
holdings proved to be disastrous and fatal for his
future as a Levant monarch.  In the process, Shirkuh
took the leading role in the Egyptian government.
Within weeks he would die, and his nephew Saladin,
who had assisted him throughout the past years of
military upheaval, would be appointed leader.22
Saladin subsequently initiated the most widespread
unification of the Holy Land in history.  He continued
7
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to preach the message of jihad and aggressively sought
to reclaim the Near East for Islam and his political
regime.  This platform reached its height with the
conquest of Jerusalem in 1187, and the subsequent
defense of the Holy Land against the Third Crusade led
by Richard of England, Philip of France, and Frederick
Barbarossa.  The Levant was almost completely
retaken by Muslims in this period, and the only major
city in Christian hands after 1193 was the port of Acre.
Upon Saladin’s death in 1195, however, the empire he
united quickly disintegrated.  As so often happens
after the unexpected death of a strong authoritarian
leader, the Muslim empire suffered from a lack of
organization, and factional leaders sought to use their
military power to wrest control of government func-
tions.  Clan struggles followed Saladin’s death, mainly
initiated by his family members.  Under this disorga-
nized Ayyubid confederacy, major regions were parti-
tioned off and given to Saladin’s relatives.  Eventually,
in 1200, As-Adil Sayf Al-Din took some semblance of
control, but the Ayyubid leaders were “frequently at
odds” with one another.23
In Rome at this time, a new, young and headstrong
Pope had come into power advocating a new crusade
to reclaim Jerusalem, attempting to resurrect the same
religious fervor that Urban had elicited from the
knights and commoners of Europe more than a
century before.  Innocent III called his followers to win
back Christ’s city, and by 1201, a treaty had been
signed in Venice, officially organizing what would
become the Fourth Crusade.  By the turn of the
century, knights and nobility interested in the military
96 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      24Omran, 191.
      25Norwich, Venice, 151.
strength of the Levant generally agreed that Jerusalem
could only fall to the Christians if an army traveled
first through Egypt.  Once they took Egypt, the rest
should fall into place.  In the century since Jerusa-
lem’s first capitulation, Egypt’s political strength
constantly threatened the safety of the crusaders
settled in the Levant.  Although its leaders were not
consistently hostile, Egypt remained Muslim-con-
trolled for the duration of the 12th century, a fact that
did not sit well with Europeans in the Levant.  Accord-
ing to Mahmoud Omran, the Egyptians (especially
under the Fatimid caliphate) posed “persistent opposi-
tion” that threatened the continued existence of the
Crusader States.24
In addition, the crusaders of 1201 had learned from
the catastrophic Third Crusade of Richard Coeur de
Lion in the previous decade.  That King gave his
opinion that Egypt was the weakest part of the Muslim
empire, and that any subsequent assaults on Jerusa-
lem must go through Alexandria in order to succeed.25
Furthermore, the previous position held by Alexandria
before Muslim conquest still had to be fresh in the
minds of those with an interest in the strength of the
Roman Church.  Alexandria, along with Rome, Jerusa-
lem, Antioch and Constantinople, had been one of the
original five patriarchates of the Church.  When the
First Crusade was called, the prospect of reuniting the
Church Empire only increased the fervor with which
Europeans set out for the Levant.  At that time, only
two of the original five patriarchates were in “Chris-
tian” hands.  The establishment of the Crusader States
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temporarily reunited most of the original Mediterra-
nean Church.  If the crusaders could regain Alexandria
in 1204 and move north, all the patriarchates could at
last be restored, along with the domination of the
Christian church throughout the Mediterranean.
The chronicler Gunther of Paris, who participated
in the Fourth Crusade, offered a number of explana-
tions for the selection of Egypt as the initial target of
the Jerusalem expedition.  “At this time a truce be-
tween our people and the Barbarians was in effect in
the regions beyond the sea.  Our people could not
violate what they had pledged in good faith.”   The
contract he mentions with the Muslims in Syria would
stand from 1198 to 1203, and had been negotiated in
the interest of protecting the Latins who lived there.
Those Europeans still living in the Levant had negoti-
ated peace with their Islamic neighbors and hoped to
keep conflict to a minimum.26  Gunther also cited the
unanimous agreement of the Crusade leaders Baldwin
of Flanders and Boniface of Montferrat on Alexandria
as the target.  They firmly agreed with Coeur de Lion’s
military assessment of the Muslim East.  Richard’s
statement proved to be even more pertinent due to the
current economic situation in Egypt, at least as it was
perceived by Gunther.  The Nile had been dry for a
period longer than normal, and word had spread to the
west that the formerly lush harvests of the Egyptians
were nonexistent because the land had become infer-
tile.  In an exaggerated estimation of the state of
Egypt’s citizens, Gunther remarked that “almost the
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entire population had either perished, the victim of
famine, or was barely eking out a poor living.”27
Although the situation was not likely this dire, the
Egyptians certainly appeared to be in a vulnerable
position.  Donald Queller seems to agree with Gun-
ther’s analysis, at least to some extent.  The Nile could
then—and still does today—weigh heavily on the
physical well-being of the Egyptian people, and subse-
quently on their political stability.  Queller also cites
hints from earlier crusaders like Amalric in the 1160s
and Reynaud of Châtillon, who led an expedition
against the Egyptians in 1183.28  For a short time
Reynaud’s presence threatened the most important
trade and pilgrimage routes of the Muslims.  In his
Ayyubid history, al-Maqrizi recognized Reynaud’s
intent to take the holy city of Medina.29  The 14th
century Muslim scholar al-Safadi referred to Reynaud
as “the most malicious, evil, and treacherous of the
Franks.”30  While ultimately unsuccessful, Reynaud
and Amalric managed to sufficiently threaten the
Egyptian Muslims and highlight the military reality
that if Egypt fell, Christians would be able to live
comfortably and freely in the Holy Land.  Moreover,
control of Egypt would split the Muslim world in two
sections, divorcing the Middle East and North Africa,
most likely rendering it powerless.31
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The assessment of the crusade leaders about Egypt
seems to have been pretty accurate.  One major
implication of their decision to go to Alexandria was
the necessity for sea travel.  The plan involved a
coastal assault on the great port city, and the crusad-
ers needed to commission an enormous fleet to carry
the proposed 33,500 crusaders necessary to sack the
city.  Therefore, the crusaders negotiated the Treaty of
1201 with the Venetians, who halted a majority of their
commercial activities over the subsequent year in
order to construct the requisite armada.  The decision
to involve the commercially proficient Venetians—the
historically debated fatal flaw of the doomed Fourth
Crusade—had many (mostly negative) implications.
The Venetians’ relationship with Alexandria and the
Egyptian government has fallen under great scrutiny
by historians hoping to find evidence that the Vene-
tians deliberately steered the Fourth Crusade not to
Egypt, but to Constantinople, which the Christians
ended up conquering by the end of their journey.  In
order to analyze this relationship, we must first look
deeper into the commercial history of Alexandria and
its involvement with the Italians.  Earlier, we discussed
the geographic advantage of Alexandria as the central
link of the commercial chain connecting east and west.
Under this advantage, Alexandria became a “major
clearing-house for spices from India and the southern
seas, providing in return a ready market for European
timber and metal.”32  In this environment merchants
could exchange goods to the great economic gain of the
Egyptian government.  For example, cotton, pepper,
and ginger were not even produced in Egypt, yet they
100 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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would pass through the commercial registry of the
Sultan and be heavily taxed.33 
The Sultan had a significant control over the trade
that occurred in Egypt.  In 1183, Ibn Jubayr traveled
from his hometown in North Africa through the Mus-
lim Empire, keeping a detailed itinerary the whole way.
Upon arriving in Alexandria, he made note of the
immediacy with which the Sultan’s agents boarded his
vessel in order to record all the luggage items and food
stores that came with the ship. In addition, they
temporarily confiscated all of the travelers’ personal
belongings for inspection.  Jubayr was particularly
upset when some of his companions’ possessions were
“lost” in this process, most likely stolen by the cus-
toms agents.34  
Some variation of this procedure occurred with
every vessel that entered an Alexandrian harbor.
According to Aziz Atiya, an expert on medieval com-
merce, the Alexandrian agents would remove the sails
and rudders of any ship coming into port.  They also
used the common restraint of a giant chain across the
breakwater, in order to keep merchants from leaving in
the night without paying the fee of one gold piece to
dock at Alexandria.  In addition to these constraints,
more restrictions were imposed on foreigners.  Mer-
chants from abroad could not travel deep into the
channels of the Nile delta or far inland at all, in order
to protect the Red Sea from potential danger.  The
sultans “zealously guarded [the Red Sea] against alien
infiltration,” because it was such a crucial point in the
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protection of Mecca and Medina, and was the site of an
active eastern trade hub.35  In addition to travel
restrictions, foreigners were kept in a funduq (Italian
fondaco), a small neighborhood or simple inn.  The
funduq had to keep its doors closed from nightfall until
dawn, and during Friday prayers.  Highly suspicious
of infidels from the west, the Egyptians enacted these
measures in order to protect their domestic security
against sabotage.36  
In addition to taxation, the state monopolized the
sale and purchase of commodities that came through
Alexandria, and had done so since 1052.  For those
raw materials imported and not marked for re-export,
the Matjar (trade office) would purchase the whole
shipment, and determine the price at which they
would enter the market.37  The Matjar was able to
obtain this monopoly by charging lower duties on
goods sold to the state than those purchased by
private individuals.  They would often resell these
goods, even war materials, on the open market for a
fair profit, after fulfilling state requirements.  Accord-
ing to David Jacoby, an expert on Near Eastern com-
merce, the Matjar would offer to buy commodities such
as timber, iron and pitch at prices that would attract
foreign merchants.  In a letter addressed to the Pisans,
Saladin encourages Pisan investment trade by high-
lighting the potentially high profit levels.38
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During the late Fatimid era, and especially after the
first wave of crusaders took control of the Holy Land,
Egypt became particularly dependent upon the west
for the supply of the war materials.  Before the fall of
Syria to crusaders, Egyptians could simply sail up
their coast to cut timber in the abundant Cilician
forests.39  This advantage was lost in the 12th century,
but they were able to draw western interest through
the Matjar’s monopoly, the eastern luxury items, and
their own production of the minerals.  Alum in particu-
lar was used abundantly in the textile and leather
industries of the Europeans, and therefore in high
demand.  The Egyptians also secured the supply of
timber, pitch and iron through contingent trade
privileges granted on the condition that the merchants
would supply timber and other wartime commodities.40
Under these agreements, many records exist docu-
menting the supply of timber to the Muslims in Alex-
andria from the Pisans and the Genoese during the
height of crusading conflicts.  The Italians rarely
missed an opportunity to capitalize on a profitable
opportunity.41  
The Pisans seemed to have gained the upper hand
in the Egyptian market in the first half of the 12th
century, receiving trade privileges and a funduq in
Alexandria before 1153, and numerous advantages in
subsequent agreements.  According to comments made
by the geographer Zuhri around 1150, it seems that
the Pisans even supplied swords to Alexandria during
the crusades.  Conflicts emerged when the Crusader
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State leaders began to realize that a fair amount of
double-dealing had occurred.  In 1156 King Baldwin III
of Jerusalem offered commercial exemptions to Pisans,
but only to those who did not get involved in the arms
and war commodity trading in Egypt.  Some responded
by cutting off the Egyptians, some continued a secret
trading relationship, and some decided to stay with the
Egyptians after the sultan offered more incentives to
keep their business.42
Although the Pisans had the strongest presence in
Alexandria through the opening years of crusading,
the Genoese and the Venetians were certainly not
excluded.  A Byzantine edict shows that the Venetians
may have supplied war materials to the Muslims in
Alexandria as far back as 971.  With abundant timber
and iron resources in the region surrounding the
lagoon, the Venetians were well equipped to supply
Egypt with the tools of war.  However, their trade focus
and political allegiance lay, for the most part, with the
Byzantines in Constantinople, where they had received
very generous customs considerations since the
chrysobull of 992.  But, this relationship changed
dramatically after Emperor Manuel expelled the
Venetians from Constantinople in 1171, imprisoning
the thousands of merchants who conducted business
in his empire, and confiscating their property.  As a
result, trade between Venice and Egypt immediately
increased.  In fact, Saladin granted the Venetians a
funduq in Alexandria in 1172 at the request of the
Doge himself.  In addition, large shipments of timber
were regularly scheduled for Alexandrian delivery.
Finally, the Venetian diplomatic embassy sent in 1174
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to patch up the misunderstanding with Byzantium
made a winter-long stop with Saladin in Alexandria.
Coincidentally, the main ambassador on that mission
was the same man who would lead the Venetians in
the expedition against Constantinople 30 years later,
the future doge Enrico Dandolo.43
Regarding the events of 1201-1204, it is the con-
tention of this paper that the Venetians had ultimately
decided that they should try to steer the crusaders
away from Egypt, and towards Constantinople or any
other region where they might find economic gains.
Many scholars have supported the claim that the
Sultan of Egypt sent gifts and bribes to the Venetians
in 1202.  These scholars contend that a formal treaty
assured the cooperation of the two powers in diverting
the crusaders, but I see no reason to believe that this
treaty was ever concluded.  It did not need to be.  The
Venetians were smart enough to recognize that their
interests would be better served if they could gain the
favor of the Egyptians and secure Constantinople for
the future.  Even if the Crusade were successful, the
Venetians could not have hoped to take the economy
of Alexandria under their control, and this was made
evident by their actions.  Their actions also proved that
their motives were driven primarily by profits and not
piety.  Venetian ascent to commercial dominance after
the conclusion of the Crusade indicates the nature of
their privileged status within the Muslim kingdom as
a result of their hand in the Crusade’s diversion.
In order to more fully understand the motivations
of Venice with regards to Egypt, we must first address
the council at Montpellier in 1162 and Third Lateran
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Council of 1179, both called by Pope Alexander III.
These councils outlawed the sale of arms, iron or
lumber to Muslims, and even banned the ferrying of
Muslims on Christian vessels.  The punishment for
breaking either of these laws was excommunication.
Based on the persistence of trading activity, the
Italians seemed to pay no heed to these papal
threats.44  When Innocent came to power at the end of
the century, he chose to implement these policies with
more authority than had his predecessors.  Clearly,
the Venetians in particular would have been economi-
cally devastated by these restrictions, as evidenced by
their dependence on the Egyptians.  When he was
informed by two envoys from Venice that the Venetians
could not observe the decree, Innocent wrote a letter
addressed to the city itself.  His letter acknowledged its
dependence on trade since they did not “engage in
agriculture,” and he allowed them to participate in
trade with Egypt as long as only non-war materials
were exchanged.  He still forbade the sale of “iron, flax,
pitch, sharp instruments, rope, weapons, galleys,
ships, and timbers, whether hewn or in the rough.”
According to this letter, Innocent simply reasserts the
provisions of the Third Lateran Council, and expects
the Venetians to offer their naval assistance to Jerusa-
lem in return for his “favor.”45
This letter is a testimony to the prevalence of the
exchange in war commodities between Venice and
Egypt, very late into the 12th century.  Interestingly
enough, the Cairo Genizah documents contained a
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letter from 1200 reporting the unconfirmed arrival in
Alexandria of two Venetian ships loaded with timber.
This anticipated shipment shows that the Venetians
had no intention of honoring the prohibition of Inno-
cent III.46  Under risk of “divine condemnation,”47 the
Venetians continued to pursue profits.  Claude Cahen
puts it directly in his assessment of Venetian inten-
tions: “In order to strengthen their right to trade in
Egypt, the Italians succumbed to the requests of the
Fatimids and the Ayyubids for armaments.”48  It is also
apropos to note that, by 1200, the impending Crusade
was well known throughout the west.  Many prominent
nobles began to take up the cross as early as 1199.49
That the Venetians (as they had done many times
before) would supply the enemy in direct defiance of
their spiritual ruler shows that they acted primarily for
the advancement of their commercial benefit.
After the Treaty of 1201 was signed, the Venetians
began to prepare for the supposed attack on Jerusa-
lem.  Scholars such as John H. Pryor and John Julius
Norwich contend that the Sultan sent envoys and
bribes to Venice at this time in order to sway the
entourage away from the shores of Alexandria.
Norwich bases his argument on a treaty signed by the
Sultan As-Adil Sayf Al-Din granting numerous privi-
leges to the Venetians, including tax considerations,
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their own quarter, and the safe passage of any pilgrims
aboard Venetian ships bound for the Holy Sepulchre.
The agreement also involved an envoy exchange, with
each side sending an ambassador to their respective
capitals.  Norwich’s argument is based on Karl Hopf’s
analysis which dates the treaty to 13 May 1202.  Six
western sources exist that address the treaty between
the Venetians and the Sultan of Egypt.  One is clearly
from after 1204; another date is unintelligible, and the
remaining four give the date as the 19th day of the
Islamic month of Saben, but not the year.  The critical
element of these sources is that in them the Sultan
refers to himself as “king of kings and Commander of
the Faithful,” a title which was not bestowed upon him
until 1207-1208.  In addition, the Sultan’s pledge to
protect Christian pilgrims would not likely have been
made at a time when the westerners were organizing a
crusade.  The Sultan would be unlikely to make any
concessions outside of the commercial sphere to
Christians in such a potentially hostile climate.  M.
Hanotaux and Ludwig Streit convincingly discredited
Hopf’s analysis in a series of works published around
the turn of the 20th century.  Their apparently correct
date of 9 March 1208 places this treaty far enough
past the Fourth Crusade to render its direct implica-
tions for the Fourth Crusade meaningless.50
Pryor’s argument, based on the Chronicle of Flan-
ders, presents a slightly different angle.  The Chronicle
states that the Sultan sent 1,000 gold marks to
Dandolo upon hearing that Egypt was under threat of
invasion.  Although Pryor ultimately admits that “there
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is no reason whatsoever to give any credence to [these
reports],” the fact of the matter remains that these
rumors did exist in the crusader camps.51  There may
not be a smoking gun, but the lack of conclusive
evidence does not mean that it did not exist at one
point.  In fact, based on the string of chance encoun-
ters that led the crusaders to Constantinople, it seems
that such a rumor is suspiciously creative.  Ultimately,
however, it seems that the rumor was more than likely
inserted into the Chronicle after the conclusion of the
Crusade as a way of placing more blame on the Vene-
tians, to lighten the guilt of the crusading host.
Nevertheless, the treaty cannot be so easily dis-
missed in this discussion.  Following the Fourth
Crusade, the Venetians did enjoy significant growth in
the rights they enjoyed in Alexandria.  The existing
treaty mentioned earlier was indeed signed in 1208,
and it is probable that this treaty was a reward for the
actions undertaken from 1201-1204 to deflect the
Fourth Crusade.  Furthermore, by 1238 a royal decree
from the Sultan Abu Bakr guaranteed the general
security of all Venetians in Egyptian lands, exemption
from any new duties, complete freedom of trade, two
factories, a bathhouse and a chapel all under their
own jurisdiction, the freedom to import wine, and
various legal privileges including trial by their peers.
In addition, the Venetians were safeguarded against
any Muslim corsairs or pirates raiding Egyptian
waters.52  Compared to the restrictions that weighed
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heavily on the freedom of the Venetians through the
12th century (they were held captive in Alexandria in
1195), they were now practically part of the family.
Although an explicit treaty does not exist, it seems that
a policy of back-scratching was certainly initiated after
the Treaty of 1201.  The Venetians were given more
favorable treatment after the Crusade than were rival
Italians from Pisa and Genoa.  (It is also imperative to
comment on the lack of a physical treaty.  Since any
agreement between Venice and Egypt would have been
kept very secret, the discovery of a physical document
outlining their commercial collusion is highly unlikely.
Consider the Treaty of 1201—it makes no mention of
Egypt either!)
Attempting to approach the decision to go to Egypt
from the Venetian perspective, at first glance it would
seem that conquering Egypt would serve them better
than Constantinople.  For example, the Venetians had
just renegotiated their chrysobull of commercial
privileges with Byzantium in 1198.  They had a signifi-
cant advantage over the Pisans and Genoese in Con-
stantinople, and trailed behind their two main rivals in
Alexandria.  Taking over the Alexandrian market would
have given the Venetians a monopoly on the eastern
connection.  However, a closer inspection into the
structure of the Egyptian and Muslim society will shed
some new light on the realities of a Christian assault
on Alexandria.
The Venetians would have been familiar with the
bureaucratic organization of the Egyptian government,
primarily through their dealings in the harbors of
Alexandria with the Matjar.  With the rise to ascen-
dancy of Islam in the Near East, Arabic metropolises
would develop in stark contrast to the major cities of
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the west.  The primary difference between the Islamic
cities and those of Western Europe lies in geography.
The rise of the Islamic urban center occurred inland,
primarily because the main contingent of Mus-
lims—Arabs and North Africans—were desert dwellers.
So when major cities began popping up, they were
naturally distant from the coastline of the Mediterra-
nean and Red Seas, as well as the Persian Gulf.
According to A.L. Udovitch, “the sea was a menacing
frontier to Muslim rulers.”53  The sea was not feared for
the inherent dangers it presented to all men—storms,
waves, etc.—but it was a threat because it threatened
the strategic unity of Islamic domination.  The sea was
the “one vulnerable frontier” where Muslims could
potentially be conquered from the West.  A perfect
example is the ease with which Reynaud ravaged the
coasts of the Red Sea once he was able to launch a
fleet there.  The Muslims’ fear grew so potent that the
Caliph Umar went so far as to outlaw sea travel for his
subjects, punishing anyone who traveled or conquered
by water.54  
Saladin maintained Umar’s attitude of negativity
toward the sea.  By the time the Mamluks took control
of Egypt in 1250, they set out to destroy coastal
fortifications so that enterprising crusade outfits could
not occupy them and threaten Islamic stability.  The
coastal centers in Islamic nations took the role of
“frontier outposts,” and were not the focus of military
or political strength.  In Egypt, Alexandria was the
main port, but it was still referred to as a frontier
town.  Cairo was the main hub of naval and military
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activity.  It also served as the financial, commercial,
and economic center of the Egyptian caliphate, while
Alexandria was its very distant “suburb.”55  Based on
previous encounters with the Egyptian navy (1123),
the Venetians would have been confident in their
ability to dominate them on the coast, but they would
have also known that the heart of Egyptian power lay
in waiting many miles to the south in Cairo.
The Muslims’ history of negativity toward sea-travel
also meant that the Venetians knew that the Egyptians
needed allies for trade in the Mediterranean.  If an
Alexandrian assault proved unsuccessful, as the
Venetians must have believed it would, they risked
losing their diplomatic ties to Egypt.  Although the
Crusaders could have taken Alexandria with ease, the
rest of Egypt would be much more unmanageable.
And, without the support of the Muslims who con-
trolled the trade routes connecting the Red Sea and
the Persian Gulf with Alexandria, those vital connec-
tions to the east would most certainly be lost as well.
As a privileged client-state of the Caliphate, the Vene-
tians could surpass their North Italian rivals and reap
the benefits of an inside connection with the Matjar.
Ultimately, this is precisely what happened.
In line with their plan to keep the coast of Egypt
free from invasion, it is my contention that the Vene-
tians did not expect to conquer Constantinople.  The
alliance with Alexius IV did not necessarily mean that
Constantinople had to be sacked, but it would mean
that the Crusaders could pass through the Byzantine
Empire on their way to Jerusalem, and avoid going to
Egypt at all.  As it turned out, the events of the Fourth
112 Historical Perspectives March 2005
Crusade played to the Venetians’ immense advantage,
no matter what their initial intentions.  But it seems
clear that the Venetians had no intention of going to
Egypt, with or without an extant treaty of collusion.
As a city founded on the principles of mercantilism,
the Venetians dealt with all contemporary political
groups as clientele, from the Pope in Rome to the
Sultan in Cairo.  This attitude sparked their rise to the
top of the Mediterranean world, and the events of the
Fourth Crusade proved paramount in this unprece-
dented ascension.
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